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When Worlds Collide: Di¤erent Comparative Static Predictions
of Continuous and Discrete Agent Models with Land
Abstract
This paper presents a di¤erence in the comparative statics of general equilibrium models with land
when there are nitely many agents, and when there is a continuum of agents. Restricting attention
to quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility, it is shown that with nitely many agents, an increase in
the (marginal) commuting cost increases land rent per unit (that is, land rent averaged over the
consumers equilibrium parcel) paid by each consumer. In contrast, with a continuum of agents,
average land rent goes up close to the central business district, is constant at some intermediate
distance, and decreases for consumers farther away. Therefore, there is a qualitative di¤erence
between the two types of models, and this di¤erence is potentially testable.
1 Introduction
Models with a continuum of consumers are often employed for reasons of mathematical convenience
or simplicity. Moreover, they can make precise the notion of perfect competition. As the number of
agents in the world is nite, models with an innite number of agents are not realistic unless they are
close to models with a nite number of agents, in terms of equilibria and comparative statics. The
scattered literature on general equilibrium models with land has tried to investigate the similarity or
dissimilarity between the equilibria of these two types of models. This line of inquiry has met with
limited success only; see Berliant (1985, 1991), Asami et al (1991), Kamecke (1993), Papageorgiou
and Pines (1990), and Berliant and ten Raa (1991). The intuition for the dissimilarity between the
models is that any partition of a -nite measure space, such as a Euclidean space, can have only
countably many elements of positive measure. So except for a negligible set of consumers out of a
continuum, all must consume or even be endowed with a set of measure zero. A corollary is that
economies with a nite number of consumers approximating these continuum economies must have
land consumption or endowments tending to zero almost surely.
This paper presents a dissimilarity in the comparative statics of these two types of models in the
cases of quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility functions. The comparative static of interest here is
the e¤ect of a change in marginal commuting cost on the per unit land rent paid, averaged over a
consumers equilibrium parcel, for each consumer. The model considered here is the standard closed
city model (with an exogenous Central Business District (CBD) and an endogenous city boundary).
It is shown that when the number of agents is nite, an increase in the (marginal) commuting cost
increases average land rent paid by each consumer. In contrast, the canonical result when there
is a continuum of agents is that average land rent goes up close to the CBD, is constant at some
intermediate distance, and decreases for consumers farther away; see, for example, Fujita (1989, p.
81, Proposition 3.14, part (iii)).
This is important for both urban economic theory and empirical work. On the theoretical
front, this result shows that models with a nite number of consumers are qualitatively di¤erent
from models with a continuum of consumers, and therefore, in general, it is impossible to conclude
that their equilibria are similar. On the empirical front, this result provides a potentially testable
prediction. We shall discuss the empirical implications in the conclusions below.
Recent literature on city formation, for example Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), or the
new economic geography, for example Fujita and Thisse (2002), generally employ a continuum
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of consumers and ordinarily have land as a commodity at least implicitly. We have postulated in
our work an exogenously given CBD. In most models of city formation, the CBD or location of
rms is endogenous, and there is an agglomeration externality used to determine these locations.
However, these models all have embedded in them a model of consumer location and commuting,
making our analysis relevant. For example, conditional on the spatial distribution of rms, one
might want to consider the consumer location problem.
In the next section we introduce the notation and present the comparative static in the case of
quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility for the model with a nite number of consumers. This is
essentially the model of Berliant and Fujita (1992) but with an endogenous city boundary that is
determined using an exogenous agricultural land rent. The last section presents our conclusions.
An appendix contains a complementary theorem on existence of equilibrium for the closed city
model where the extent of the city is endogenous and determined by agricultural land rent.1
2 Increasing Rents per Unit Parcel
2.1 Notation
Consider the standard general equilibrium model with a linear city (the CBD at 0) and endogenous
city size, l. Suppose there are N  2 agents. Each agents utility function is the same and is given
by u(s; z), where s is the size of their land parcel and z is consumption of a composite numéraire.
Land is assumed to be a normal good. In addition to (s; z), an agent chooses the location of their
lot at distance x from the CBD. Each agent has the same endowment w of the numéraire. In
order to consume z, an agent has to commute to the CBD to earn income. The exogenous cost
of commuting is t > 0 per unit distance to the CBD, and is measured in terms of the numéraire.
Land price per unit is given by a density p. Agricultural rent outside the city is given by  > 0.
As usual in this model, an agents budget constraint is given by z +
R x+s
x p(s)ds  w   tx. In
other words, total spending of an agent on consumption of z units of the numéraire, and a lot of
size s at distance x from CBD is less than or equal to the agents endowment less the commuting
cost tx.
1Although equilibrium in the quasi-linear utility case is found explicitly, the Cobb-Douglas case yields a model
with no known result on existence of equilibrium. Of course, without such a result the comparative static could be
vacuous.
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An equilibrium is given by a collection (sn; zn)Nn=1, and a price density function p such that
consumers are optimizing and markets clear. Agent marginal rates of substitution, land price, and
agricultural rent determine the city size endogenously, as the sum of individual parcel sizes.
2.2 Equilibrium Parcels and Their Comparative Statics
As in Berliant and Fujita (1992), let Z(s; u) be the level of consumption required to achieve utility
u, when lot size is s. That is, Z(; u) is the equation of the indi¤erence curve for utility u. Let
(; )   Z(; ). Then, using results from Berliant and Fujita (1992), s > 0, ss < 0, u < 0, and
su > 0. Notice that s(s; u) is the (negative of) slope of an indi¤erence curve, and hence it is a
marginal rate of substitution.
Consider an equilibrium allocation (sn; zn)Nn=1, and let equilibrium utility levels be (un)Nn=1.
Notice that as agents have the same endowments and utility function, equilibrium utility levels are
identical: u1 = u2 =    = uN . As usual, we label agents by their distance from the CBD, with
agent 1 being closest to the CBD and agent N being farthest away from the CBD. Moreover, as
shown in Berliant and Fujita (1992), an equilibrium land price function is one that is monotonically
non-increasing over distance from the CBD, and has the following form. Over agents 1 parcel, the
price is constant at that persons equilibrium MRS; over agent 2s parcel, at the front end, the
price decreases as the MRS of agent 1 until it hits the level of agent 2s MRS, and then stays at
the level of agent 2s equilibrium MRS, over agent 3s parcel, at the front end, the price decreases
as the MRS of agent 2 until it hits the level of agent 3s equilibrium MRS, and then stays at the
level of agent 3s equilibrium MRS, and so on.
As usual, rst order conditions imply that in equilibrium,
s(s

n; u

n) = s(s

n+1; u

n+1) + t; for n = 1; : : : ; N   1; and
s(s

n; u

n) =  for n = N:
In particular, s(s

N ; u

N ) =  implies that s(s

N 1; u

N 1) =  + t, and proceeding inductively,
s(s

N k; u

N k) =  + kt, for k = 0; : : : ; N   1. Changing index yields
s(s

n; u

n) =  + (N   n)t n = 1; : : : ; N: (1)
This provides a relationship between equilibrium marginal rates of substitution in terms of the
exogenous parameter of interest t. The relationship is helpful in proving the main result in this
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paper. Toward that goal, the comparative statics of the equilibrium parcel sizes are computed rst,
as follows.
The above relationship implies that for n = 1; : : : ; N ,
N   n = @
@t
s(s

n; u

n) = ss(s

n; u

n)
@sn
@t
+ su(s

n; u

n)
@un
@t
:
Equation (1) helps determine how equilibrium parcel size changes with respect to t, as follows. As
ss < 0, and su > 0, it follows that for n = 1; : : : ; N ,
@un
@t
< 0 ) @s

n
@t
< 0:
Recall that u1 = u2 =    = uN . Moreover, as land is a normal good, for agent 1 (closest to the
CBD), @u

1
@t < 0. These observations imply that for n = 1; : : : ; N ,
(N   n)  su(sn; un)@u

n
@t
ss(s

n; u

n)
=
@sn
@t
< 0:
Thus, for each agent, as commuting cost increases, the equilibrium parcel size, (and therefore, city
size) decreases.
2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Rents
For notational convenience, write u1 = u2 =    = uN  u, and write sn as sn. With this
convention, as is well-known, the equilibrium price density is as follows.
p(s) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
s(s1; u) on [0; s1]
s(s 
Pn 1
k=1 sk; u) on
hPn
k=1 sk;
Pn 1
k=1 sk + sn+1
i
n = 1; : : : ; N   1;
s(sn+1; u) on
hPn 1
k=1 sk + sn+1;
Pn+1
k=1 sk
i
n = 1; : : : ; N   1;
where, for n = 1,
Pn 1
k=1 sk  0:
Dene the total land rent paid by consumer n to be
rentn =
Z Pn
k=1 skPn 1
k=1 sk
p(s)ds
2.4 Comparative Statics of Rent per Unit Parcel
This subsection presents the main comparative statics result; how average land rent, or rent per
unit, changes with respect to transport cost; that is, @@t

rentn
sn

.
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Theorem 1: If utility is quasi-linear, u(s; z) = v(s)+z (where v is increasing and concave), or
if utility is Cobb-Douglas, u(s; z) = sz1  (where  2 (0; 1)), then for n = 1; :::; N , @@t( rentnsn ) > 0.
Proof: Notice that rent1 = s(s1; u)s1, and therefore,
@
@t

rent1
s1

=
@
@t
s(s1; u) =
@
@t
( + (N   1)t) = N   1 > 0:
Therefore, for the rst agent, rent per unit increases with commuting cost. Moreover, for n =
1; : : : ; N   1,
rentn+1 =
RPn 1
k=1 sk+sn+1Pn
k=1 sk
s(s 
Pn 1
k=1 sk; u)ds+
RPn+1
k=1 skPn 1
k=1 sk+sn+1
s(sn+1; u)ds
= (sn+1; u)  (sn; u) + s(sn+1; u)sn
= (sn+1; u)  (sn; u) + ( + (N   n  1)t)sn:
Consequently, for n = 1; : : : ; N   1,
@
@t

rentn+1
sn+1

= 1
s2n+1
sn+1
h
s(sn+1; u)
@sn+1
@t + u(sn+1; u)
@u
@t   s(sn; u)@sn@t   u(sn; u)@u@t
i
  1
s2n+1
[(sn+1; u)  (sn; u)] @sn+1@t
+ 1
s2n+1
sn+1

sn(N   n  1) + s(sn+1; u)@sn@t

  1
s2n+1
s(sn+1; u)sn
@sn+1
@t
= 1
s2n+1
sn+1 [u(sn+1; u)  u(sn; u)] @u@t
+ 1
s2n+1
sn+1sn(N   n  1)
+ 1
s2n+1
sn+1 [s(sn+1; u)  s(sn; u)] @sn@t
+ 1
s2n+1
[s(sn+1; u)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1; u)  (sn; u))] @sn+1@t :
As lot sizes are positive, the above relationship implies that for n = 1; : : : ; N   1,
@
@t

rentn+1
sn+1

> 0 , sn+1sn(N   n  1) + sn+1 [u(sn+1; u)  u(sn; u)] @u@t
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1; u)  s(sn; u)] @sn@t
+ [s(sn+1; u)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1; u)  (sn; u))] @sn+1@t > 0:
Notice that the rst term on the right-hand side is non-negative, the third term is positive because
ss < 0 implies that s(sn+1; u)   s(sn; u) < 0 and that @sn@t < 0, and the fourth term is positive
because (; u) is concave and @sn+1@t < 0. In general, the second term is non-positive, because
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su  0 implies that u is (weakly) increasing in s, sn < sn+1, and @u@t < 0. Thus, in general, it is
possible that the expression on the right-hand size is not positive. However, as documented next,
the expression on the right-hand size is positive for the frequently-used classes of quasi-linear and
Cobb-Douglas utility.
For quasi-linear utility, the second term above equals zero, as follows. Write u(s; z) = v(s) + z,
where v is increasing and concave, and notice that (s; u) = v(s)  u. Consequently, u =  1 and
su = 0. In particular, u does not depend on s, and the second term above equals zero. Therefore,
in the case of quasi-linear utility, for every n, @@t

rentn
sn

> 0.
For Cobb-Douglas utility, the entire expression above is positive, as follows. For notational
convenience, the argument u in the functions , s, ss, u, and su is suppressed for now. Notice
that for n = 1; : : : ; N   1, sn+1sn(N   n   1)  0 implies that in order to conclude that for
n = 1; : : : ; N   1, @@t

rentn+1
sn+1

> 0, it is su¢ cient to show that
[s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))] @sn+1@t
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)] @sn@t
+ sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)] @u@t > 0:
Using the equilibrium relationship that for n = 1; : : : ; N ,
@sn
@t
=
(N   n)  su(sn)@u@t
ss(sn)
;
the expression on the left-hand side of the above inequality can be written as follows.
[s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))] (N n 1) su(sn+1)
@u
@t
ss(sn+1)
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)] (N n) su(sn)
@u
@t
ss(sn)
+ sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)] @u@t
= [s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))] (N n 1)ss(sn+1)
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)] (N n)ss(sn)
+ [s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))]  su(sn+1)ss(sn+1)
@u
@t
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)]  su(sn)ss(sn)
@u
@t
+ sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)] @u@t :
For this last expression, notice that the rst term is non-negative, and the second term is positive.
In the case of Cobb-Douglas utility, the sum of the remaining three terms equals zero, as shown
below.
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Consider the utility function, u(s; z) = sz1 . Then
(s; u) =  u
1
1 
s

1 
s(s; u) =

1 
u
1
1 
s
1
1 
ss(s; u) =   (1 )2 u
1
1 
s
1
1 +1
u(s; u) =   11  u

1 
s

1 
su(s; u) =

(1 )2
u

1 
s
1
1 
su
ss
(s; u) =   su :
Therefore,
sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)]   sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)] su(sn)ss(sn)
  [s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))] su(sn+1)ss(sn+1)
=   11 u

1  sn+1
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
+ 1 u
1
1 
 
1
s
1
1 
n+1
  1
s
1
1 
n
!
sn+1sn
u
+
"

1 (sn+1   sn)u
1
1 
s
1
1 
n+1
+ u
1
1 
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!#
sn+1
u
=  u

1 
1  sn+1
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
+ 1 u

1  snsn+1
s
1
1 
n+1
  1 u

1  sn+1
s

1 
n
+ 1 u

1  sn+1
s

1 
n+1
  1 u

1  snsn+1
s
1
1 
n+1
+ u

1  sn+1
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
=  u

1 
1  sn+1
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
+ u

1  sn+1
 
  1  1
s

1 
n
+ 1 
1
s

1 
n+1
+ 1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
= u

1 
"
  sn+11 
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!
+ sn+11 
 
1
s

1 
n+1
  1
s

1 
n
!#
= 0:
Consequently,
[s(sn+1)(sn+1   sn)  ((sn+1)  (sn))]  su(sn+1)ss(sn+1)
@u
@t
+ sn+1 [s(sn+1)  s(sn)]  su(sn)ss(sn)
@u
@t
+ sn+1 [u(sn+1)  u(sn)] @u@t
= 0:
Therefore, in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility, for every n, @@t

rentn
sn

> 0.
3 Conclusions
We have examined a comparative static in closed city models with an endogenous city boundary
both with a continuum and a nite number of consumers, and we have found a di¤erence. For re-
searchers in urban economic theory, the implication is that there are qualitative di¤erences between
the models. For empiricists, the possibility of testing the models against one another is real.
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Although the quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility cases are su¢ cient to make our point that
the comparative statics in the model with a nite number of consumers and the model with a
continuum of consumers can di¤er,2 the analogous comparative static for general utility functions
seems di¢ cult, or at least algebraically burdensome. But even the result for Cobb-Douglas utility
must be backed up by a theorem on existence of equilibrium for the nite model with an endogenous
city boundary.3 We provide this theorem in a brief appendix below.
Which model, nite or continuum of agents, will be veried empirically? Probably this depends
on the context. One obvious way to test the models is to look at the per unit cost of land parcels
in a city, say Chicago, before and after a change in commuting cost, say the introduction of a new
el line. The work of McMillen and McDonald (2004) should be useful. Our model does not
account for rm relocation and its impact on the comparative static, so this must be controlled for
in empirical applications.
It is unclear if the di¤erence in the comparative static presented extends to other comparative
statics as well; however, there is another comparative static di¤erence between the models with a
nite number of agents and a continuum of agents that applies for all utility functions.
Consider the e¤ect of a change in marginal commuting cost on each consumers equilibrium mar-
ginal rate of substitution of land (for composite consumption commodity), or equilibrium marginal
willingness to pay for land.
In the nite model, for each consumer, her equilibrium marginal rate of substitution of land is
the same as the price of land at the back of the equilibrium parcel. In this model, a necessary
condition for either an equilibrium or Pareto optimum is that for the outermost consumer, the
marginal willingness to pay (or rent) at the back end of a consumers parcel must be equal to
agricultural land rent, and this must increase in steps of exactly t as we move inward from the
outermost consumer. For example, the second to the outermost consumer must have marginal
willingness to pay for land or land rent at the back end of its parcel equal to + t; see equation (1).
In summary, the derivative of the marginal willingness to pay for land of each consumer n or the
rent at the back end of the equilibrium parcel of consumer n with respect to t is equal to N  n  0
for every consumer n.
2 It is easy to verify that the result in Fujita (1989) applies to quasi-linear utility.
3Notice that existence of equilibrium in the case of quasi-linear utility is not an issue, since we can nd the
equilibrium explicitly using rst order conditions, and thus we have proved that it exists. For more detail and a
graphical depiction of the nite model, see Berliant and LaFountain (2006).
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In the continuum model, for each consumer, his equilibrium marginal rate of substitution of
land is simply equal to the price of land at his equilibrium location. In this model, the average cost
of land is equal to the marginal cost, so the comparative static for the continuum model remains
the same as the one enumerated above.
This additional comparative static has an impact on some important results. For example, if
one extends the model to allow a city developer to maximize land rents by choosing transporta-
tion infrastructure t subject to some cost function and subject to the land market equilibrium
conditions, we conjecture that the solution will be di¤erent in the two models even assuming the
same parametric forms, since the derivative of the marginal willingness to pay for land with re-
spect to marginal commuting cost will play a crucial role in the rst order conditions for developer
optimization.
4 Appendix
Theorem 1 Under standard regularity assumptions on the utility function (Berliant and Fujita,
1992, Assumption 1) there exists an equilibrium.
Proof: For p1  +(N  1)t, construct xn+1(p1), the sum of consumersMarshallian demand
for land when consumer 1 (the consumer closest to the CBD) faces price p1, as in Berliant and
Fujita (1992, pp. 561-562). Set l = xn+1(p1). Apply Berliant and Fujita (1992, Proposition
4): under Assumption 1 of their paper, for any xed l > 0, there exists an equilibrium. This
equilibrium will have the property that the marginal willingness to pay for land of consumer N ,
the outermost consumer, is equal to the agricultural land rent.
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